by msweeks
Sydney-based IBSG Director, heading up the IBSG public sector team in Asia Pacific for Cisco. Co-author of the Connected Republic 2.0 More about msweeks
Fit for purpose..the machine is broken
This might be one for my UK colleagues in the first instance. A new report from UK public sector think tank REFORM suggests that the Whitehall bureaucracy is no longer 'fit for purpose'. This is an extract from its executive summary: The systemic weaknesses in Whitehall have built up over the years and are now of critical proportions...the reasons for this are entrenched – the culture and structure of Whitehall rewards risk avoidance and punishes innovation. One public sector consultant interviewed for this report said that the motto of the Civil Service should be “consent and evade”; others spoke of an absence of “moral courage”. Whitehall is not accountable – success or failure seems to have little or no consequence for departments. It displays inadequate performance management. It is weak at implementation. This is because the Civil Service hides behind the veil of “independence”. This is a myth – the Senior Civil Service is already highly politicised. Other countries have recognised that independence is no longer a valid concept and that transparency and accountability are key to successful organisations. In peer group countries – including France, Australia and Canada – Ministers appoint senior civil servants. Australia, for example moved away from the British model to their new approach in 2004 which has improved performance." Leaving aside for the moment the question of whether Australia's "reforms" have actually resulkted in "improved performance", the report explores the possibility that part of the problem with wide-ranging policy reform is that the machine which is responsible for its delivery is fundamentally broken. The report recommends the end of the doctrine of ministerial accountability (assuming of course that many would argue that it has pretty much disappeared anyway), opening up appointments to more external recruitment and more direct accountability of civil servants for their work. The report calls for more courage and openness by the civil service and suggests that civil servants should act as though all of their work is open to the widest possible scrutiny - which, presumably, might act as something of a brake on the headlong rush for more moral courage, greater risk taking and more innovation? It's an interesting question though...how much of the search for deeper policy reform and the evolution towards what we're all calling "government 2.0" is hostage to the uncomfortable possiblity that the machinery we're destined to rely on to make those journeys isn't up to the task?
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Comments
My first reaction to this report (as an ex-civil servant!!) was that knocking the government and the civil service is just an easy way to grab headlines and look radical. Rather than engaging with the real difficulties of the situation, you just tap into people's discontent with the status quo and claim that your proposals are the answer. Which is more fit for purpose the civil service or private sector finance companies? Or even the civil service or political parties/think-tanks?
So the rhetoric does annoy me a bit and of course it just reflects the fact that think-tanks are desparate for publicity and funding (and the two are closely related). In terms of substance I would like to see some changes, but I do think that the issue of promoting sensible risk-taking in a public sector context is a deep one and it would be good to see some really good thinking on this issue (which I don't think this document really provides). In the meantime my personal reactions are:
1) I do think we need some change to the doctrine of ministerial responsibility - if the minister is responsible for everything, then all too often he/she ends up not really being responsible for anything.
2) I would focus ministerial responsibility on strategic policy and budget decisions with perhaps targeted exercise reviewing and revising implementation machinery in specific areas. Ultimately if ministers make "wrong" decisions in this area, I suppose it would up to the PM to sack them with the electorate ultimately sacking the government if too many decisions are not right.
3) This would imply having some high-level officials who were responsible and accountable for implementation. These would be the people who would be sacked or expected to resign if things went wrong. Obviously there would always be scope for argument (ministers did not give me the right budget, they asked me to focus on other things and this distracted me from the area where the problem arose etc), but the aim should be to create a sufficiently clear framework so that in most cases the accountability is reasonable clear.
4) I am not particularly worked up about having more political appointments. Generally, I think appointments should be on an open, competitive basis especially at senior levels, so I don't think anything should necessarily be reserved for civil service professionals (although it would be hard to be the PM's private secretary if you had not understanding or experience of how Whitehall worked!). Political appointments are Ok, but should be reserved for jobs that relate to policy advice, managing that process and media - so special advisors, chefs de cabinet etc.
updated about 1 year ago, posted about 1 year ago
One of the foremost experts on the Westminster-Whitehall system, Donald Savoie, wrote a thorough book last year on this topic entitled, "Court Government and the Collapse of Accountability". He's a prolific and brilliant writer, with a deep-seated passion for the institution and I'd say that his core point is that current reforms (and by extension to your reference Martin, the advent of Gov't 2.0) are happenning without any particular thought or related strategy as to the end-result (or larger needs that are driving such reforms) and further, that roles and responsibilities are so blurry that people can easily proclaim their responsibility while also just as easily avoid accepting any blame...accountability has broken down across the syatem, not just at the Ministerial level, for example.
A paragraph of course can't do justice to his work... You can read/preview the book here...http://books.google.com/books?id=nEj7xjsqz7UC&dq=donald+savoie+court+government&printsec=frontcover&source=bl&ots=-Yybmaq8TR&sig=6pHnmNBE2ys7l9f_UP7HZss7G9E&hl=en&ei=t4y2SdzQBZKmsAOKpuzaBA&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=2&ct=result#PPR3,M1
updated about 1 year ago, posted about 1 year ago
All good points. I'm sure that no single report, from wherever it emanates, is going to comrehensively deal with these difficult issues that basically come to grips with the real question - to what extent is the civil service ripe for some real institutional innovation? My guess is, not terribly originally, more than its reflexive defenders assume and less than its headline-grabbing critics might like us to believe. Just by the by, I can't help offering at least a mild defence of think tanks, although Paul's pragmatic critique is perhaps not far from the mark! But if we're going to assume that anything think tanks come up with is driven purely by a grab for headlines that fuel the next round of fund-raising, that might diminish the value of work from this quarter that is often very good (and also limits our capacity to use the reports we agree with!).
I think Paul has picked many of the real issues but my sense is that we're generally not making too much progress around the world in defining some of the new doctrines and practices which his comments imply. And the reason is perhaps hinted at in Terry's reference to the work of Savoie (which I don't know). I agree that many of these shifts are happening without an overwhelming sense of strategy or compelling vision of the shape and practices we think might be more 'fit for purpose' into the 21st century. A case perhaps of good old 'muddling through' incrementalism?
posted about 1 year ago